Emotional Synthesis and Moral Sociality

Joseph Longo
Eastern Michigan University

ABSTRACT
The question of the nature of emotions has been a hotly debated topic since the Greeks, and its role, or lack of a role as some might put it, in our moral lives has been recognized throughout the history of ideas. From Aristotle to Hume, from William James to Alison Jaggar, and everyone in between, the desire to understand our emotions and how they affect our lives, and how they should affect our lives, remains a necessary part in our quest for not only ethics, but the nature of knowledge, social life, and consciousness. I will discuss these four areas in this paper, beginning with a look back at modern and contemporary theories of emotion, pulling especially from Alison Jaggar, then moving into my main argument about the nature of emotions as a synthesis of value-built passive attitudes and active judgments in the form of emotional experience, discussing the nature of objects of emotions, especially regarding other people, using Sara Ahmed’s concept of the “Other” to explicate my own position. Afterwards, I’ll be describing the important moral problem in human relationality of idealization, or the process by which an agent creates and lives by their idea of someone or something instead of what that person or thing is, and offer an approach to it using this definition of emotions as synthetic experience, so as to both better avoid and fight against the problem of idealization, especially through the potential of Ami Harbin’s concept of “disorientations” and Ahmed’s discussion of fear.

KEYWORDS
Emotions, Fear, Idealization, Positivism, Cognitivism, Social Constructionism, Attitudes, Judgments, Observations, Death
INTRODUCTION: POSITIVISM, COGNITIVISM, AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

When looking at the contemporary history of ideas regarding theories of emotions, there are generally three different schools of thought: Positivism, sometimes called the “Dumb View” by critics, expounded on by William James and, to a lesser degree, John Dewey in the late nineteenth century, holding that emotions are essentially the same as feelings, bodily disruptions of normal rational activities like making judgments and observations. Feelings are never “about” something for positivism, but are simply a kind of physiological accident completely separate from any cognitive functions. The problems with this, as identified by cognitivist thinkers coming afterward among others, are multiple. For our purposes here, we’ll discuss the main one related to the transition to the cognitivist approach, which is, as Alison Jaggar puts it in her paper “Love and Knowledge”, “emotions differ from feelings, sensations or physiological responses in that they are dispositional rather than episodic” (Jaggar 1989, 155). This is where “emotions as judgments/intentional” comes into play, trying to explain the affective nature of them without relying on calling them passive accidents.

A famous example of the cognitivists, Robert C. Solomon, known as the premier Sartre scholar of the late twentieth century, wrote in his book entitled “The Passions” that “the expressions of emotion are not independent of emotion but built into the system of judgments that constitute the emotion... the context of an emotion is not just a cognitive context, but an active context in which we are engaged in a world that we care about” (Solomon 1988, 188). In a very existentialist manner, specifically on the importance of freedom and choices, Solomon and the cognitivists approach emotions from the opposite side of the positivists, insisting that our emotions are choices and judgments we make about each other and the world around us. Alison Jaggar, in her account of this transitional history, says about the cognitivists:

These newer conceptions emphasize that intentional judgments, as well as physiological disturbances, are integral elements in emotion. They define or identify emotions not by the quality that may be associated with them, but rather by their intentional aspect, the associated judgment. Thus, it is the content of my associated thought or judgment that determines whether my physical agitation and restlessness are defined as “anxiety about
my daughter’s lateness’ rather than as ‘anticipation of tonight’s performance”. (Jaggar 1989, 155)

However, she argues that cognitivists, even with their recognition of intentionality as a necessary aspect of emotions, still proliferate the same problems as the positivists, namely the distinction between what some philosophers of emotion call “attitudes” and the mind (judgments), perhaps tending towards a solipsistic approach of emotions in a Neo-Cartesian dualistic way just as the positivist completely separated rationality and emotions (as feelings).

This is where Jaggar, as well as most of the other authors we’ll be looking at in this paper, split from the cognitivists and transition towards social constructivism. Their approach, though differing in a number of ways between authors, looks especially at the importance, even necessity, of the social world in our emotional lives. Some of them take a very different approach to existentialism from Solomon and focus more on the points Sartre, Beauvoir, and others make on the “Other”; others delve more into the social aspects of fear, anxiety, disorientation, and their effects on constructed values in the form of historical associations and stereotypes. Key to both of these types of approaches to constructivism is the concept of values and their relationship to our emotions and thus our moral agency; this, and its ties to both “emotions as judgments” from the cognitivists and “emotions as attitudes” from Dewey and Greenspan, is what I want to deal with in this paper: That, instead of one side of a separation or dualism of attitudes and judgments, emotions are value-constructed syntheses of passive attitudes and active judgments in experience about a particular object, necessarily a part of our observations and lived-experiences, and that this can both create and fight against the moral problem of idealization.

**PART ONE: EMOTIONS AS SYNTHESES IN EXPERIENCE**

1. Value Construction and Sociality

   Whether one thinks of people as individuals, what Sartre calls “being-for-itself”, or not, the fact that everyone is part of a society in some form is apparent, that we are in relationships with each other, and that these relationships at least govern, if not determine, who we are. These relationships all have structures to them, often in the form of social norms and rules about the appropriateness of
certain actions, and these in turn affect our emotional experiences. Margaret Walker writes in “Ineluctable Feelings and Moral Recognition” that “I think it is dangerous not to notice that all human societies elaborately construct patterns of relationships and specific norms for them” (M. Walker 1998, 76-7); the danger here lies in the ignorance of values as being inherited in our social experiences and their effects on our attitudes and judgments. Many previous thinkers have, I think, often confused values for instincts in saying that some values are inherent to human nature, though our instincts have certainly influenced our value construction throughout history. Values, as socially constructed, are a necessary part of lived-experience as continually morphing lenses through which we exist in the world, characterizing our relations to ourselves, others, and our surroundings, both in our appropriate perceptions of these and in stereotypes and misunderstandings. A prime example of this that I will use throughout this paper is fear, which, though it can be justified in a dangerous situation, is often a response on the part of the fearer to the values influencing our relation to another, and, as Sara Ahmed puts it, “the relation between objects that are feared is shaped by histories that ‘stick’, making some objects more than others seem fearsome” (Ahmed 2004, 67). Fear becomes a discoloring of the value-lens, painting both the fearer and the “fearsome” object in these strict roles through the misapplication of a given value or the application of an unfounded, unjust value in cases of racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression. This also is the case for many other emotional experiences: hatred, anger, resentment, love, joy, confusion, discomfort, etc. Another example, one that is key to understanding how values relate to our ideas about and relationships to ourselves, is the topic of Ami Harbin’s “Bodily Disorientation and Moral Change”, about the experience of bodily disorientations and how they relate to and can change our moral agency. Harbin describes bodily disorientations as

...experiences of shock or surprise, unease, and discomfort. They are often cued by feelings of being out of place, unfamiliar, or not at home. When everyday practices of embodiment are disrupted, we can come to feel disoriented, almost always in ways that make us unsure of how to go on. (Harbin 2012, 2)

As she notes, the confusion becomes born out of a misapplication and/or breaking-down of the value structure we’ve held up until the moment of disorientation.
This, I argue, is a possible, and very probable, effect of our passive attitudes being changed through the deconstruction of one or multiple values, requiring our attitudes to shift to fit the new situation, thus changing our agency and judgments and allowing our values themselves to reconstruct according to these shifts. This relationship between our attitudes and values creates a sort of feedback loop, just as later we’ll see happens between our attitudes and judgments in their synthesis in experience, and Jaggar notes this first loop and its effects on our judgments and their objects:

Values presuppose emotions to the extent that emotions provide the experiential basis for values... And just as values presuppose emotions, so emotions presuppose values. The object of an emotion - that is, the object of fear, grief, pride, and so on - is a complex state of affairs that is appraised or evaluated by the individual. (Jaggar 1989, 159)

The moral problem with this is, again, that these evaluations are often unfair/unjust in the misapplication of our values and emotions. Our emotions and values’ connection begins to apply themselves in, as Ahmed put it, a “sticky” way to their object through the repeated practice of evaluation in ignorance of their injustice. Ahmed, writing about the history of this in racism and the fear inherent to it, writes

… the sideways movement between objects, which works to stick objects together as signs of threat, is shaped by multiple histories. The movement between signs does not have its origin in the psyche, but is a trace of how such histories remain alive in the present... The movement of fear between signs is what allows the objects of fears to be generated in the present (the Negro is an animal, bad, mean, ugly). The movement between signs is what allows others to be attributed with emotional value, as “being fearsome”. (Ahmed 2004, 66-7)

II. Interests and the Apparent Conflict in Emotions

This first feedback loop, and the second as well, is also, I argue, what creates interest between individuals, or our interest in things in general, both material and abstract. When someone matters to us, that importance has been crafted
through a period, whether long or short, of connecting our values and emotional experiences with that person in shared events, often requiring a reconstruction of our value histories to fit with that person and thus influencing our emotional experience of that person, whether it’s happiness, contentment, anger, fear, or shame. Shame is a particularly interesting relation, with Sartre talking about its necessity as the main way of experiencing the “Other”, and Lisa Guenther, in her critique of Sartre, discusses Levinas’ shame as a form of ethical interest, saying “The other side of shame is interest; we feel shame because others matter to us in ways that are constitutive of who we are” (Guenther 2011, 24); the object of our values and emotions is always something that connects to those values and emotions in particular ways, even if that connection is a completely opposing structure, which is often the case with Harbin’s bodily disorientations:

As disoriented, we can feel and act lost, we don’t know how to interact appropriately with our surrounding environments or with others around us. As disoriented, we tend not to know our proper objects of action and attention: what actions we should aim to complete, who or what we should interact with in the world, what stands to help or harm us. (Harbin 2012, 6)

Defining interest as this connection between the feedback loop of our values and emotions and the object of our sociality is what allows for the synthesis of the two emotional experiences to be synthesized as “experience”; to clarify, I mean experience as a kind of sociality viz. social experience, not the totality of our being (though some philosophers do argue that sociality is the totality of our being). This inherent sociality of emotions is why social constructivism is so necessary to understanding our emotional experiences, since, as stated above, we learn and inherit our values from others, and thus learn and inherit our emotional capacities from others. Jaggar, when talking about the appropriateness of emotions as being socially constructed, writes:

The most obvious way in which emotions are socially constructed is that children are taught deliberately what their culture defines as appropriate responses to certain situations: to fear strangers, to enjoy spicy food or to like swimming in cold water. On a less conscious level, children also learn what their culture defines as
the appropriate ways to express the emotions that it recognizes.

(Jaggar 1989, 157)

As our historical associations increase, our interests are able to develop both consciously and unconsciously, developing our emotional experiences in their attitudes and judgments. Our passive attitudes are in particular important to recognize for the power they have on our judgments specifically because of their being unconscious, and therefore often unseen and unresponded to. Philosophers such as Patricia Greenspan arguing still for the distinct separation of passive affects and judgments (Greenspan calls them both attitudes of a kind (Greenspan 1980, 237)) claim that such passive affects are still “irrational” in the sense that they take away control from our judgmental capacities, Greenspan arguing that “… there may be a sense in which emotions are intrinsically irrational. Though we have some rational control over them, our control is limited; they are based on reaction to particular facts as they come into consciousness, rather than consideration of all the relevant reasons”, but I would rather suggest that, while the affective attitudes can certainly influence our judgments, this isn’t an inherent “irrationality”, as “reactions to particular facts” are still a form of interpretative experience (Greenspan 1980, 237); the spontaneity of the interpretation does not inherently detract from its capacity to add value (in the qualitative sense) to our judgments, which I argue they often do by providing insight into the momentary social relations passing by, giving judgments a much wider range of possible paths, which Greenspan does argue for to a degree:

There may still be enough similarity between the two to allow for their comparison on cognitive criteria, in relation to a total body of evidence. I have admitted as much... by characterizing them as attitudes directed towards an object, with appropriateness taken as the value of emotions which comes closest to truth for judgments. (Greenspan 1980, 239)

Walker does so as well by claiming that “resentment, gratitude, love, forgiveness, and, I would add, trust and mistrust are among ‘personal’ reactive feelings and attitudes to expressions of others’ wills” (Walker 1998, 62). However, this still maintains a dualistic stance regarding the two as distinct and separate, whereas I argue here that the two are too tied together to have any efficacy or even proper existence apart from each other. The reason for this is that our attitudes create
another feedback loop with our judgments, both fueling each other and shifting each other to fit social situations in the world, which Jaggar also claims:

   Emotions, then, are wrongly seen as necessarily passive or involuntary responses to the world. Rather, they are ways in which we engage actively and even construct the world. They have both ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ aspects, each of which conditions the other; in some respects, they are chosen but in others they are involuntary. (Jaggar 1989, 159)

Cognitivism fails to determine where our interests lie and how we experience them as tied to our agency, as Jaggar explains: “When intentionality us viewed as intellectual cognition and moved to the center of the picture of our emotion, the affective elements are pushed to the periphery and become shadowy conceptual danglers whose relevance to emotion is obscure or even negligible” (Jaggar 1989, 156).

III. Objects of Emotions

We’ll get back to the implications brought up by this theory of synthesis in the next section; for now, I’d like to focus on often missed aspect of emotions that is necessary to both our attitudes and judgments, as well as to their synthesis: the particular object they are aimed at. The objects of our emotions are often passing by, (though memory serves to keep the fading idea of them in us), but just as emotions necessarily require socially structured concepts to be built around (Jaggar 1989, 157), they also require objects of experience, examples being loving the beloved, fearing the bear, hating the racist, enjoying the burger, etc.; there is always an “about” or a “desire”, as Solomon writes (Solomon 1988, 189-190), that characterizes them. Fear is once again a particularly useful example in its ability to make concrete the object while it passes by or hasn’t even passed by yet, and, more importantly, by its capacity to misapply values and historical associations. Sara Ahmed, writing using an example from an essay by Fanon, asks

What makes us frightened? Who gets afraid of whom?... It is not simply a question of some body being afraid of some body who passes by. On the contrary, the object of fear is over-determined... The fear announces itself through an ontological statement, a statement a self makes of itself and to itself – “I’m frightened”. (Ahmed 2004, 62)
The object of our fear, and all our other emotions, becomes, in a Hegelian sense, the bearer of our consciousness, in that our social existence becomes dependent on the object to bear that emotion with us. This dependency, while a common case in social experiences, can very easily become a problem by creating a misapplication of values that needs to be restructured, often in the form of disorientations, such as anxiety. However, anxiety, Ahmed argues, is different from fear in that it can potentially remain in the present because it latches onto objects instead of moving towards an anticipated future, that “anxiety becomes an approach to objects rather than, as with fear, being produced by an object’s approach. This slide between fear and anxiety is affected by the passing by of the object”, that fear “involves an anticipation of hurt or injury. Fear projects us from the present into the future... So, the object that we fear is not simply before us, or in front of us, but impresses upon us in the present, as an anticipated pain in the future” (Ahmed 2004, 65-6). The problem with both of these is that they can create an unreal expectation of their objects, and other emotions fall into this same misapplication of judgment-making by our introducing unjustified fear and anxiety. There is, of course, justified fear (justified anxiety doesn’t seem very plausible), but such justification is generally seen right as the object begins to pass by, not when it’s far out of view. Fear thus transforms us into a being of fear, while also transforming the object of our fear into a being of fearsomeness; respectively, anxiety transforms us into a being of anxiety and everything else into objects of threat. This is the same for all emotions: in loving someone, we each become the lover while that someone becomes the beloved; in hating someone, we become the hateful while they become the hated; in enjoying something, we become the joyful while that something becomes that which is enjoyable. What this leads to is the feedback loop between our attitudes and our judgments that thus influences our observations about a particular object.

PART TWO: OBSERVATIONS, SOCIALITY, AND IDEALIZATION

IV. Passions in Perceptions

Positivism, as the “heir” of the scientific revolution, brought with it a notion that has poisoned all logical thinking and experimenting: That reasoning is only valid when it is devoid of emotions, often called “the myth of dispassionate
investigation” by critics (Jaggar 1989, 161). Jaggar argues about this exact problem in her paper, saying:

The validity of logical inferences was thought independent of human attitudes and preferences... Because values and emotions had been defined as variable and idiosyncratic, positivism stipulated that trustworthy knowledge could be established only by methods that neutralized the values of individual scientists. (Jaggar 1989, 152)

This grand mistake has created the illusion that our observations about anything other than our emotions themselves, and even them sometimes in the sciences, should not be informed by our emotional experiences, even while our observations inform our emotional experiences, as Jaggar writes:

Just as observation directs, shapes, and partially defines observation. Observation is not simply a passive process of absorbing impressions or recording stimuli; instead, it is an activity of selection and interpretation. What is selected and how it is interpreted are influenced by emotional attitudes... Illustrating how the individual experience of emotion focuses our attention selectively, directing, shaping, and even partially defining our observations, just as our observations direct, shape, and partially define our emotions. (Jaggar 1989 160)

I suggest here, however, that emotions, as a synthesis of attitudes and judgments, are themselves our observations, that the emotional experiences we see as accompanying our observations about objects are in fact the observations themselves, or rather that the observations are the judgment part of the synthesis. We often call this the inescapable bias, which Jaggar notes:

We have seen already that distinctively human emotions are not simple instinctive responses to situations or events; instead, they depend essentially on the ways that we perceive those situations and events, as well on the ways that we have learned or decided to respond to them. Without characteristically human
perceptions of and engagements in the world, there would be no characteristically human emotions. (Jaggar 1989, 160)

The importance of this is the very strange implication of this feedback loop: that knowledge, at least in the experiential knowledge in our relationships to each other, the world, and things in general, becomes a necessarily social experience that is constructed by our emotional experience, in turn constructing a greater sociality and emotional existence. The possibility of this to mature our moral agency is apparent:

I take moral agency to be largely about day-to-day practices of interaction: with spaces, objects, living beings, events, projects, ideas, and norms. As Walker and Weiss partly indicate, we engage in such interaction through overlapping embodiments of attention, intention, communication, and care. (Harbin 2012, 3)

Moral maturity begins to develop through a recognition of the feedback loop by allowing for a wider range of actions in response to it and to problems often arriving through its misapplication: “I also argue that disorientations can allow for changed action not exclusively because of attention, reflection and changed understanding, but also through shifts in pre-reflective experience and especially through disruptions in habitual practices of relating to others” (Harbin 2012, 5-6). As Harbin notes, this change in our observational capacities requires a change in our approach to the “Other”, just as Guenther writes:

Reason is not longer to be found in a faculty of the individual subject, but in the practice of giving reasons to an other who puts me in question; knowledge is no longer the essential correlation of consciousness to a world, but the offering of a world that was hitherto mine to an Other who commands me to generalize my singular experience, to put my sensible affects in common by using concepts. (Guenther 2011, 31)

V. Sociality and the Other

The “Other” is both an anthropological/philosophical mystery and a concept of common understanding. It is a common understanding because we all
experience the “Other”, and it’s a mystery because our experience of the Other seems contradictory to our being social creatures, as Guenther puts it when critiquing Sartre’s idea of “being-for-itself”: “As one who is born to another, I am always already in relation to Others, even before I become aware of myself as a separate subject. There was never a time when I actually existed as a pure for-itself, untouched by the complicated burden of being-for-Others” (Guenther 2011, 27). The disparity between these two apparent facts of social experience and its roots become clearer, however, when we look at the movement Guenther and Jaggar describe between the two, with Guenther noting the importance of shame in relationships:

In shame, I am expelled from the paradise of a purely subjective freedom. While my own freedom does not disappear, it is now encumbered by the existence of others who challenge my freedom with their own... The lesson which the Other teaches me is shame... that I have an outside that is vulnerable and exposed, a body that exceeds my own conscious experience. (Guenther 2011, 26-7)

Jaggar goes further to say:

There is a sense in which any individual’s guilt or anger, joy or triumph, presupposed the existence of a social group capable of feeling guilt, anger, joy, or triumph. This is not to say that group emotions historically precede or are logically prior to the emotions of individuals; it is to say that individual experience is simultaneously social experience. (Jaggar 1989, 158)

This adds to Guenther’s claim, that the presence of the Other forces me through shame into sociality, that sociality in fact is one and the same with individual experience. The “Other”, in its transition from not existing at all to existing distinctly in relation to a “being-for-itself” to causing that “being-for-itself” to exist “for-Others”, moves even further to become the individual’s experience itself, thus beginning to resolve the conflict. This can, of course, be recognized in Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger’s works as the process towards individuation from sociality while maintaining such. As a conflict to be resolved, especially in individualistic cultures like much, if not all, of the West, the values we hold will
most likely be frustrated by our attempts to do so, but these frustrations can provide an even greater force of motivation for our attempts:

I argue that they (disorientations), can strengthen relationality, heighten sensitivity to vulnerability, draw attention to dynamic experience, and spur political prioritizing... Given that moral agency is partly enacted through the ways we interact with and depend on other people, corporeal disorientations can strengthen moral agency by altering how we act and rely on others within relational frameworks. Disorientations help us better recognize relationality when they highlight how all possibilities for action are constituted through complex relationships with others. (Harbin 2012, 11-12)

At the very least, the opportunity presents itself when we’re confronted with the conflict, more so when it confronts us clearly and aggressively. However, the conflict also presents the opportunity to retreat back to seeing the “Other” as someone separate.

VI. The Problem of Idealization

When the “Other” is discussed in philosophy and anthropology, it’s often focused on the fear associated with them. As discussed above, genuine fears are, I argue, possible when fearsomeness becomes apparent in the moment of its passing by, not in anticipation of the future. However genuine a fear is, though, we have noted that fear, along with other emotions, pulls the “Other” into a relationship just by our having the emotional experience, giving attributes to them that they may or may not have, and this is especially clear in fear:

Fear envelops the bodies that feel it, as well as constructs such bodies as enveloped, as contained by it, as if it comes from outside and moves inward. And yet fear does not bring the bodies together, as a form of shared or fellow feeling. While signs of affect seem to pass between the bodies (the shivering of the Negro becomes the trembling of the white little boy), what passes is not the same affect, and it depends on the (mis)reading of the other’s feelings. In other words, the other is only felt to be
fearsome through a misreading, a misreading that is returned by the other through its response of fear, as a fear of the white child’s fear. (Ahmed 2004, 63)

I argue here that, as stated before, fear can begin to envelop and distort our other emotions as it envelops us and the “Other”, thus distorting our entire sociality. To clarify, the fear recognized here is what I see as the most basic fear, the fear that produces and is also proliferated by radical individualism, the source of the disparity with the “Other”: the fear of death, or rather, the fear of non-existence. This comes in two forms: first, of course, is the literal fear of death, a negation of one’s own existence (though obviously, this becomes a topic for theology, where we won’t go in this paper); second, and much more valuable to the problem of idealization, is one’s experience of death in the apparent loss or passing by of the objects of our emotional experiences, especially the people we interact with and are interested in. This is visible most often in familial and romantic relationships, with the death of a beloved family member or the breaking up of a relationship becoming experiences of death for us by the loss of the developed sociality with an “Other”, but it can be seen even in the simplest of everyday practices and tasks: “Not knowing how to respond to someone can be disorienting, as in awkward conversations (Capello 2007, 53); when we find ourselves called to respond to conflicting needs or requests, like when we are inclined to laugh at a racist joke (Maclaren 2009, 39-41); after the excitement of a first kiss” (Harbin 2012, 6). In short, as Guenther pointed out, the possibility of death shows its face whenever we become vulnerable in any way by the continual presence of the “Other” at different levels of intensity, as well as different kinds of presence. Our vulnerability and our emotional experience of it will be different if it’s with a romantic partner than if it’s with a sexist or racist, though both kinds “position us as other” (Harbin 2012, 8); this sense of “otherness” directed at us only adds to the fear of death, as it puts us in a worse position than before by increasing the possibility of death in substantial loss - a loss of selfhood in the present while already expecting a total negation of self.

This fear reaction, in general, is the process and cycle of idealizing that this base fear of death produces: a retreat into the self to fend off the “Other”’s intrusion into our otherwise stable emotional experiences and sociality, a retreat that pushes the “Other” back into that role instead of opening up to moral maturity in expanded sociality, and further envelops both yourself and the “Other” as
struggling “Others”, thus foreclosing any kind of further sociality. Guenther puts it well when she says:

To reduce someone to their ethnicity, race, or religion - even if this aspect of their identity means something important to that person - is to chain them to their identity in a way that forecloses any future that could be otherwise, a future in which this or that aspect of one’s identity might have a somewhat different meaning. (Guenther 2011, 30)

Ahmed also argues that though this is for the purposes of security, it ultimately ends up backfiring: “Stereotypes seek to fix the meaning of the other, but the very repetition that is required to enable such a fixation renders them a side of insecurity rather than security” (Ahmed 2004, 64). Idealization thus becomes the death of the self without the self realizing its own demise.

And yet, even the fear and experience of death in loss can become, if we allow it, the ultimate force of motivation for maturing our moral agency. Or rather, our experience of loss can become the kind of disorientation necessary to spur emotional change, to resolve the conflict between “being-for-itself” and “being-for-Others” in their transition, and to allow for emotional maturity in our sociality by opening the door for recognition of the “Other” in our experience. Greenspan and Harbin both explore at the end of their papers how this can lead to proper moral agency, Greenspan focusing on mutual identification: “Genuine emotional identification with others, then, motivates spontaneous sympathetic behavior, behavior that express our concern for others’ interests for their own sake. I think it should be obvious that such behavior facilitates social relations” (Greenspan 1980, 240-1), and Harbin noting the effect the disorientations can bring of a greater reflectivity on the values structuring the experience and the other emotions tied to it: “Being disoriented in body can mean that what is appropriate to say, who is appropriate to touch, how it is appropriate to look and move, and what kinds of emotions are appropriate to express become more open questions - the social norms that govern them are made questionable” (Harbin 2012, 16). The possibility of this transition and resolution is particular, I argue, to the experience of death as loss, and a response to it, often born out of desperation, of reflection on the values we hold, the attitudes we have, and the judgments we make as a synthesis
of emotional experience, and thus on the nature and maturity of our sociality and moral agency.

VII. Conclusion

I have tried in this paper to provide an account of both emotions as a synthesis that becomes emotional experience in general, as well as a major moral problem connected to all the different parts of that synthesis and to the sociality brought out of emotional experience, and yet as theories of emotion continue to develop its own problems become apparent: Is it mixing two aspects of human experience that can’t be mixed? What about emotions that we’re completely unaware of in a psychoanalytic sense? However, the account I suggest here is intended most as a defense against the problems that dualistic views bring with them that proliferate the problem of idealization by creating a disparity between a supposed private self of cognition and public, social self of emotional experiences; the two aspects of attitudes and judgments are combined in this approach to show the clear feedback loop the two have on each other that can only be produced by the values inherited in our natural and never-ending sociality to fight against the problem of idealization and its distortion of our emotional experience and human experience in general. Though our fear of death may never completely reverse into an acceptance and negation of “Other”-ness, I think it’s at least a good starting point, and, as Ahmed puts it perfectly: “If it is fright that ‘brings one to life’, then it does so only by announcing the possibility of death” (Ahmed 2004, 68).

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