A Defense of Sally Haslanger’s Sociopolitical Account of Race

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ABSTRACT
In this paper I outline Sally Haslanger’s “sociopolitical” account of race, which describes the term in a way that is ameliorative, helpful, and practical for those involved in social justice efforts and racial reconciliation. Haslanger’s account isn’t the only one in the field of social ontology to pursue these goals, however. Chike Jeffers provides a rival ameliorative account that emphasizes cultural impacts on race, responding and objecting to the differences that he identifies between his account and Haslanger’s. Furthermore, I defend the definition that Haslanger proposes from the objections that Jeffers raises, and I proceed to argue that Jeffers’ account in turn is subject to a litany of problems that make his definition of race unworkable as an alternative to Haslanger’s. These problems arise in part due to the fact that Jeffers seeks to reclaim a positive notion of “white pride,” and are compounded by Jeffers’ failure to adequately explain how certain types of racism and injustice are excluded from both his reclamation of white pride as a positive and ameliorative term, and from his account of race as a whole.

KEYWORDS
Chike Jeffers, Culture, Ethnicity, Metaphysics, Race, Sally Haslanger, Social Justice, Social Ontology

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I. INTRODUCTION

Like Sally Haslanger’s “Tracing the Sociopolitical Reality of Race,” a contribution to What is Race? Four Philosophical Views, this paper defends a normative and functional definition of race. I move past the idea that there must be a firm consensus on the definition of race, as I believe that debates regarding this consensus permit little progress in establishing practical and functional accounts of the term (Haslanger 2019, 8-11). In this paper, I argue that Haslanger’s construal of race as a sociopolitical phenomenon (within the United States) carries strength as a philosophical and functional definition of race.

Haslanger’s presentation of race in this essay also stands in contrast with definitions she has previously proposed, as her goal here is strictly explanatory and utilitarian in terms of pointing out and diagnosing racism and the reasons for and results of racialization (Haslanger 2019, 24-25). Earlier definitions proposed by Haslanger were intended to define race “[as a term] whose reference is fixed by ordinary uses, but whose content is discovered empirically using social theory,” and thus define race in more theoretical terms (Haslanger 2010, 169). I take on Haslanger’s current view because I believe that her sociopolitical account provides the most conceptual clarity and explanatory power in terms of individual agency, cultural diversity, (including cultural outliers to racial groups) and the way in which races arise. I consider objections to Haslanger’s account of race by Chike Jeffers, and I provide replies to his objections.

II. BUILDING A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION OF RACE

Haslanger outlines her sociopolitical account of race through an explanation of “racialization” as follows:

Social/Political Race (SPR): A group G is racialized relative to context C iff members of G are (all and only) those

(i) who are observed or imagined to have certain bodily features presumed in C to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region (or regions)--call this “color”;

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(ii) whose having (or being imagined to have) these features marks them within the context of the background ideology in C as appropriately occupying certain kinds of social position that are in fact either subordinate or privileged (and so motivates and justifies their occupying such a position); and

(iii) whose satisfying (i) and (ii) plays (or would play) a role in their systematic subordination or privilege in C, that is, who are along some dimension systematically subordinated or privileged when in C, and satisfying (i) and (ii) plays (or would play) a role in that dimension of privilege or subordination.¹ (Haslanger 2019, 25-26)

The definition that Haslanger provides has many strengths. One initial and readily apparent strength it has is its agency-based language, which describes how agents attribute characteristics to other agents. This language enables Haslanger to describe how individuals interact with and ascribe conceptions of race, as opposed to making group-based generalizations regarding epistemic access and intent, which miss the fine-grained detail of racial interactions in their low-resolution analyses (Pappas 2004, 28).

In Haslanger’s view, people are racialized by the context they find themselves as part of, particularly by other members of that context. This process of racialization occurs due to the perception by others that certain biological characteristics place them in a group thought to have ancestral links in a certain region. It is important to note here that Haslanger also thinks of this link between person and geography, or person and ancestry as being made by an outside observer, instead of a self-reflecting or self-categorizing agent. This is also to say that in addition to groups, individual people can be racialized if they are perceived to have biological or ancestral links to a racialized group. Expanding from Haslanger’s view, this categorization on an individual basis likely occurs mentally, as in a close person-to-person interaction; racialization occurs instantly as the first thing we notice about someone is often the color of their skin.² This mental categorization is then

¹. Italics Haslanger’s.

². A person’s gender expression and level of physical ability may also be among the first things that someone notices when they encounter another person. As this paper is meant to serve the purposes of intersectionality, it isn’t my intent to rank order the importance of these attributes or argue that the color of one’s skin takes priority in recognition over the other two attributes I
reflected on our interactions with people, including how we treat them, what our assumptions are about them, and what topics we engage (or avoid engaging) them with in conversation.

The overall coherency of this definition can be seen in the natural and fluid way that (ii) flows from (i). Because person X is racialized in context C, they are placed in either a subordinate or privileged group due to the associations of their race with said group. Interestingly, according to Haslanger, the features that ground racialization (though often imaginary) can be enough to “mark” someone as either being privileged or subordinate. In Haslanger’s view, perceptions, regardless of their truth, are incredibly powerful in their ability to maintain and uphold societal structures, for better or worse. Additionally, Haslanger claims that this action of marking reinforces the idea that a racialized person belongs to a privileged or subordinate group, tying a distinct form of perception to the perpetuation of two specific sociological categories.

The justificatory nature of racialization and marking is explained in greater detail as Haslanger describes the third part of her definition of race. To Haslanger, these two actions contribute to upholding systemic subordination and privilege in context C, although she denies any causality between marking and the existence of privilege and subordination. I think that she would attribute the causal origin of these two groups to the unfortunate and systemically unjust outcomes of history. The apparent location of persons within these categories may be the result of either generations of slavery and oppression, or the profiteering that resulted from this oppression. Many other historical outcomes may causally contribute to the creation of these two categories. The maintenance of these categories on the other hand, is a result of collective affirmation of the reality of these groups, regardless of the fact that they are reductive and subject oneself to the fallacy of black-and-white thinking (i.e., someone is either privileged or subordinate, there is no in-between). In simpler terms, marking and racialization contribute to the persistence of these two groups but aren’t responsible for bringing them about. The aforementioned collective and continual affirmation of the existence of these groups that allows them to persist, while certain systemic historical outcomes caused them to arise.
In terms of the overall scope of Haslanger’s definition, her ultimate goal in proposing her new definition of race, and in exposing the inadequacy of our current understanding, she explains, is to structure an understanding of race on different terms in opposition to common perception and provide an understanding of race through the lenses of society and culture. This debunking approach is also meant to be used by those seeking to identify and root out instances of injustice in their communities, and thus provides a much more ameliorative and functional definition of race that contrasts with theoretical definitions she has posed in the past two decades.

Her most recent account provides a re-assessment of our prior beliefs and applications of those beliefs, causing us to “motivate a new relationship to our practices.” Haslanger argues that the current grounding for racialization is flawed due to its reductive grouping and reliance on characteristics and attributes that may or may not exist. Thus, Haslanger debunks our current conception of race and how we racialize people by describing how we think of race, and how racialization occurs (Haslanger 2019, 30-32).

Furthermore, when looking at the content of Haslanger’s definition as a whole, we can see that it isn’t necessary for an individual to participate in a shared culture, language, or set of practices to be considered part of a racialized group. Seeing as Haslanger defines a race as a group of people who have been racialized to similar geographic origin, ancestry, or the apparent presence of shared physical features, various cultures, whether original (i.e., deriving from a pre-racialized status) or reactionary to racialization, can arise. Racialization is a process that occurs immediately upon seeing someone, regardless of their burqa, kente cloth, sari, or t-shirt.

Here, Haslanger makes a distinction between race and ethnicity. Ethnicities entail those cultural practices as defined by art, language, and geography, and can precede racialization. She argues that the process by which these ethnicities are placed hierarchically in context C is described by racialization. In addition to this, once the imposed racialization has ended, ethnicities and ethnic identities can continue existing. Haslanger develops her definition further on an explanatory basis by attributing greater power to the process of racialization as an explanation for race, when compared with other “cultural” explanations and definitions of race.
Haslanger explains modern racial groups by positing that they are combinations of various ethnicities that have been racialized together as a kind of ethnic amalgam (Haslanger 2019, 27). She also establishes a third category in addition to race and ethnicity to explain how people of various ethnicities have responded to being racialized:

...there are three relevant types of groups: ethnicities, pan-ethnicities, and races. Ethnicities have distinctive cultures. Races typically consist of people from multiple cultures. Pan-ethnicities emerge when multiple groups are racialized and treated as one group, and form an identity and way of life as a result. So Hmong, Japanese, Khmer and Korean are ethnicities. They are all treated as Asian in the United States, and Asian Americans\(^3\) form a pan-ethnicity. (Haslanger 2019, 28)

This third group, the pan-ethnicity, forms a different kind of category than the previous two that Haslanger has described, in terms of its specific origin.

Whereas races are ascribed and attributed by observers separate from the racialized person in question, and ethnicities are established on a basis of community, ancestry, culture, and geography, pan-ethnicities result from the reaction of a group of ethnicities to being racialized. This reaction consists in the affirmation and sense of community that arises between ethnic groups when they are racialized together. This does not mean, however, that all Asians share a cultural identity, as a Nepalese person living in Nepal may not think of themself as being Asian, because they might not have ever been racialized by anyone. What this means is that Asian-Americans as a pan-ethnicity may share a cultural identity that they have adapted for themselves, and that Asians outside of America obviously don’t fall under the pan-ethnicity of Asian-American, nor might they think of themselves as even being Asian (Haslanger 2019, 28).

Additionally important to note is that shared culture in Haslanger’s view, (in contrast with the view of Chike Jeffers) is not a defining feature of race. As mentioned before, people can be racialized based on perceived common ancestry or physical features. Participation in a common culture can be a characteristic of a racial group, but only ethnicities and pan-ethnicities are defined primarily in terms of a shared culture.

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3. Italics Haslanger’s.
Contrary to diminishing the role of culture in race however, Haslanger believes that shared cultural practices on a racial level can be responses to racialization that act as powerful coping mechanisms that can serve a vast array of purposes, often outstripping the need to comfort members of an oppressed group. This isn’t to say that culture on a racial level must be a response to oppression, merely that this is one form that culture can take in a racial context and thus culture would still exist even in the absence of racialization and oppression. A potential example of this can be seen in the gospel songs that enslaved people in the Americas sang as they worked. This coping method used in response to oppression has since heavily contributed to the thriving contemporary genre of Black Gospel Music, and music from this genre has in turn been sampled by artists such as Kanye West and Chance the Rapper, showing that this response to oppression has culturally outstripped its original intent and is sometimes even being applied to currently pervasive issues of injustice that African-Americans are faced with.

Haslanger also cites that culture (as a whole) is dynamic and versatile, forming from communal interaction and enjoyment, personal identity, and responses to the external world, along with responses to oppression and societal problems. Clearly, we shouldn’t reduce culture to a simple etiological result of racialization, although some parts of culture can be interpreted as a result of racialization as we have seen thus far.

Furthermore, Haslanger defends her construction of race by arguing that her definition is merely one of many explanations that can be outlined based on the questions that are asked of race regarding its origin, role, and influence. Although she acknowledges that other descriptive accounts could provide a somewhat accurate explanation of how we currently conceive of race, as mentioned before, Haslanger seeks to provide an ameliorative and aspirational understanding of the concept that aids activists, minorities, and anti-racists in defining social problems and fighting systemic oppression while also helping social ontologists, philosophers, and sociologists to understand where race comes from and how culture interacts with race and is integrated with it. Definitions and clarifications regarding terms such as ‘marking’ and groups such as ‘privileged,’ ‘subordinate,’ ‘ethnicity,’ and ‘pan-ethnicity’ help further these goals as well (Haslanger 2019, 29).

Finally, Haslanger argues that our conception of race should allow fluidity between races. In her mind, a just world is one which allows for the fluidity of
members between racial categories as she describes that she comes from a family of both mixed racial and religious backgrounds. This means that Haslanger defines one’s individual participation in culture (rather, one’s ethnicity, and further, one’s racial self-image) as being deeply voluntary in addition to being built and engaged with on a basis of personal volition and agency.

III. JEFFERS’ OBJECTIONS TO HASLANGER’S SOCIOPOLITICAL ACCOUNT OF RACE

Haslanger’s definition of race does not come without its due controversy. The objections I consider come from Chike Jeffers. From the beginning of his argument in his contribution to What is Race? Four Philosophical Views, Jeffers makes it clear that his utmost priority in the metaphysics of race is to create explanations of racial phenomena that are useful in application to societal problems and are able to combat any efforts that “lead us astray in that enterprise” (Jeffers 2019, 176-177). Thus, the projects and methods of both philosophers are similar (as both seek to provide ameliorative accounts) despite the fact that their conclusions differ. Although Jeffers sometimes finds a reasonable degree of similarity between his cultural construal of race and Haslanger’s sociopolitical view, he highlights an array of differences.

Jeffers states that he and Haslanger agree that the project of defining race should be to clarify terms regarding racial phenomena that have typically been taken to have bases in genetics and biology. Furthermore, he argues that his methodology is similar to Haslanger’s in that it seeks to devise a definition of race that serves a practical purpose through re-evaluating the way race is commonly thought of while making suggestions for improving or eliminating these prior definitions. Another goal that Jeffers and Haslanger share is to “compare different metaphysical stances on the nature and reality of race by asking what significance they accord to our differences in appearance on the basis of ancestral place of origin” (Jeffers 2019, 192). An illustration of this goal can be seen in how Haslanger asserts that perceived characteristics can be powerful and hold perceived reality regardless of whether these characteristics objectively exist. In other areas however, as will be seen, Jeffers’ and Haslanger’s goals differ to some degree.
In Jeffers’ mind, the key difference between his construal and Haslanger’s is not the methodology of their inquiry, but rather the conclusions that are reached as a result of this inquiry. Both philosophers arrive at social constructivist conclusions agreeing on the point that race is fundamentally a phenomenon that arrives via social forces instead of being grounded in biology. Jeffers’ conclusion however, has a cultural bent while Haslanger offers a more social or sociopolitical explanation of this phenomenon. This isn’t to say however that Haslanger’s definition doesn’t involve culture.

While Haslanger addresses how culture arises within races and how culture interacts with race, she distributes explanatory power in racial contexts to other factors such as perception, marking, and categorization. It’s merely the case that Jeffers emphasizes culture more and gives it a greater role in his explanation of race as well as in his objections and replies to Haslanger’s main contribution in *What is Race? Four Philosophical Views*. Jeffers does this in order to emphasize the idea that race is an emergent expression of culture which responds to racism and racialization in an identity-shaping manner.

Jeffers also identifies some differences in terms of the overall aim of his project when compared to Haslanger’s. While both Jeffers and Haslanger seek to disrupt old ways of thinking and re-evaluate our relationships to our practices, Jeffers’ primary goal is both to destroy any grounds that a particular racial group might use to claim superiority, and to reorient racial practice towards revealing diversity and the fertile and fruitful dialogue that comes from discussions of race (Jeffers 2019, 192-193).

Jeffers clearly defines his cultural constructionist view early in his response to Haslanger:

> The reason my view can be identified as a kind of cultural constructionism is because it takes culture to be fundamental from a normative standpoint, for I hold that the value of cultural difference is the reason we may value race and hope to see it live on indefinitely, rather than take its destruction to be our goal, at least in the long run. (Jeffers 2019, 194)

Jeffers takes this to be a major point of difference between his construction of race and Haslanger’s. For Haslanger he argues, culture arises naturally from ethnicities, but arises somewhat artificially from races due to a response to racialization. On
the other hand, he thinks that culture is inherent to race and is defined by it. He also thinks that race isn’t a negative and should be valued for its ability to foster culture and community. This is Jeffers’ position because he sees race as an expression of cultural variation among people. Thus, in a way culture and race are somewhat inseparable in his view.

Jeffers also sees no need to include Haslanger’s categorization of the pan-ethnicity in his philosophy. Instead, he refers to ethnicities as well as races and wants to do away with the additional category. He says that his main challenge in discarding pan-ethnicities is explaining the importance of culture to race. It also seems that Jeffers believes that races as groups or categories do all the explanatory work that Haslanger’s pan-ethnicities do, so for Jeffers it would be pointless to posit the existence of an additional group. Additionally, Jeffers objects to an understanding of races as units containing individuals who don’t share the same culture. Jeffers argues that ethnic groups can be broadened, revealing the way we linguistically refer to unified cultures. Using the example of an “eastern” ethnicity, we can refer to Gujarati culture. Expanding from there, we can refer to Indian culture. Expanding from there, we can refer to Asian culture and so on (Jeffers 2019, 196).

Surprisingly, Jeffers points out that his construal of race as it interacts with culture could be used to justify an idea of white pride or pride in any racial identity for that matter. Jeffers argues that “the end of racism [doesn’t require] the end of whiteness.” Thus, Jeffers holds that culture is fundamental to a philosophical and self-evaluative conception of race and that “white people” (along with members of other races, respective to their own cultures) “should cherish white culture.” Jeffers clarifies, however that the kind of “white pride” his conception of race justifies is much different than the modern-day alt-right and white supremacist version.

Instead, an ideal white pride would consist of white people being able to appreciate past and current white culture in light of collaboration with people of color in dismantling systems of oppression. This version of white pride (here using Jeffers’ terminology) is divorced from any conception of white superiority. Jeffers also argues that a goal for modern social justice movements should be to redefine racial pride in terms of helping other racial groups in eliminating oppression. This said, there are no normative descriptions or evaluations in Jeffers’ view of white
pride that explain how this form of pride might aid in doing this (Jeffers 2019, 198-199).

Jeffers also objects that Haslanger’s concerns (about the exclusion and conformal pressure that would be incurred were race to be defined primarily in terms of culture) are unwarranted. He posits that once racism is eliminated, there will be no need for oppressed races to form resistant and reactionary cultural movements and hence, members of these races won’t feel forced or pressured to participate in these reactionary movements. He makes this claim to support the argument that culture is a necessary aspect of race and should be viewed positively in its functional integration with race (Jeffers 2019, 200-201).

IV. MY REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS OF JEFFERS

I believe that the proposed alternative understandings and objections leveled against Haslanger’s definition of race as provided by Jeffers are ungrounded and flawed. In this section I argue this point seeking to defend Haslanger’s definition of race, her conception of the role of culture, and the way she thinks culture interacts with race. Furthermore, I believe that Jeffers gives culture too large of an explanatory role in his conception of race as outlined in his response to Haslanger.

To begin my defense of Haslanger’s goals, I think it is helpful to understand where Jeffers’ own goals go awry so I can examine how the rest of Jeffers’ objections fail. Primarily, Jeffers aims to strike down any definition of race that could be used to support the idea of the supremacy of a single race. I think that this goal is very ambitious and admirable and should be a key aspiration of any definitional account of race but where Jeffers is concerned, we encounter an inconsistency. This inconsistency is formed by Jeffers’ later affirmation of ideas of racial pride. Jeffers argues that racial pride isn’t something to be eliminated but kept and revised. While I agree that having pride in one’s race, and further, pride in the achievements of one’s own culture are a benefit, I think that Jeffers fails to adequately explain how this racial pride won’t devolve into racial supremacy which he is clearly opposed to.

While Jeffers seems to make an attempt at anticipating and rebutting this objection, he fails to adequately do so. He tries to explain away this objection by simply stating that “the possible persistence of white cultural identity I countenance is necessarily divorced from the widespread treatment of whiteness
as supreme.” While Jeffers also says that his view “ought to be rejected if it gives non-accidental support to white supremacist calls for white pride,” (Jeffers 2019, 199) I believe his view accidentally fails to rule out white supremacist calls for white pride and thus incorrectly conceives of a way that racial identity and culture should be reconciled. This entailment of Jeffers’ account should not be disqualified from discussion on a basis of the metaphysic seeing as Jeffers seeks to provide an ameliorative account of race, which is hampered and harmed by Jeffers’ failure to exclude racist versions of white pride from his conception of this term.

The failure I reference is encountered when Jeffers attempts to explain what a redeemed white pride will look like. He claims that in a post-racist future, white people won’t draw on ancestral/national history or perceived achievements of their race for sources of pride but will (or rather should) take pride in standing side by side with other racial groups in fighting against racism and systemic oppression. I would certainly say that Jeffers paints an optimistic and glorious picture of the future of racial pride (which he affirms for all races, not merely Whites) but how will our conception of racial pride make this radical shift?

Current conceptions of racial pride are based on histories and cultures that are rich and complex. Some white people credit themselves with being the founders of Christianity and the western world. Some Asians take pride at the sight of the Taj Mahal or the Great Wall of China. Is it certain that fighting racism could provide this same richness and complexity? Jeffers seems to have nothing to say on the matter. We would assume based on his previous position that Jeffers would answer “yes” in response to this question but based on the implications of his account, it doesn’t seem likely that his definition can support this assertion. How he would justify the idea that fighting racism can enrich cultural identities in this way is a complete mystery.

Jeffers stumbles on a linguistic issue as well. He wisely believes that using the terminology of “white pride” has the potential to be harmful for current discussions of culture and race so he accordingly understands why his talk of racial pride could be met with some apprehension. However, he looks forward to the day when all racial pride can be cumulatively embraced and affirmed as he thinks that this will also entail the redemption of the terminology of racial pride. How this transformation will occur is left ambiguous as well. As a whole, Jeffers provides an account of racial and social identity that fails due to an inability to exclude certain types of racism and injustice.
As a point of defense for Haslanger, I think that Jeffers’ claim that culture is “fundamental from a normative standpoint,” and his claim that races should be preserved because they embody cultural differences don’t represent vast gulfs between his position and Haslanger’s (Jeffers 2019, 194). Certainly under Haslanger’s system it can be said that culture is normative as Haslanger evaluates ethnicities, pan-ethnicities, and races in terms of their relations to culture. Additionally, Haslanger can describe a greater quantity of phenomena using her three categories (providing accounts of culture on all three levels) when compared to the explanations provided by Jeffers’ categories of race and ethnicity. Haslanger would certainly agree that races embody cultural difference however, we wouldn’t be in danger of losing our culture should racial categories be eliminated, in her view.

Racialization plays a key role here as well. Can we currently consider an idea such as “Hispanic culture” without racializing Hispanic/Latinx people? I don’t think we can. Furthermore, Haslanger’s conception of race appears more dynamic as races only appear to have corresponding cultures due to the artificial and created nature of the racial category itself. Thus, how can we say that culture is “fundamental” to race?

I believe that Jeffers’ intent to eliminate Haslanger’s category of the pan-ethnicity would be a mistake as well. The strength of this category is that it preserves and values the individual volition and will of a racialized agent. This account of agency helps document how members of differing ethnicities respond and adapt to being racialized, creating a narrative of a unified, pan-ethnic culture that reveals how agents interpret and reflect on their individual cultural experiences and practices in light of their place within one or more communities. The kind of linguistic expansion that Jeffers discusses appears to play a similar role only that it reveals the way in which we as racializing people think about the identity and race of others (Jeffers 2019, 196). This exploration by Jeffers doesn’t have the same power of Haslanger’s account of the pan-ethnicity which describes how racialized people think about their own identity.

Finally, I think that Haslanger’s concern is warranted. If culture were to be the sole cause for race, then people would be excluded from racial groups for cultural non-participation. The argument that Jeffers puts forward stating that in a post-racist society there will be no reactionary movements, and hence no feelings of exclusion from these reactionary movements is concerning, as it fails to
explain why reactionary cultural movements will be done away with. As previously mentioned, cultural practices that react to oppression and injustice have adapted and evolved but show no sign of fading away.

Haslanger acknowledges that these reactionary movements can evolve into cultural waves centered merely around the enjoyment, entertainment, and ritual practices of the members of a racial group, existing independently of any oppression or reaction towards systemic injustice. Jeffers would be wrong to assert that exclusion couldn’t occur in this kind of cultural environment. A powerful counterexample to Jeffers’ assertion of the non-existence of racial exclusion in a post-racist society can be seen in music. I have heard Asian-American and African-American parents deride their children for “listening to white music.” This accusation doesn’t reprimand the child for being unwilling to participate in the project of reactionary cultural movements (although it may in some contexts). Rather, it makes the assertion that the child isn’t satisfied with their own culture and is trying to supplant it with another. We can see from this counterexample that exclusion from racial groups can occur with or without the existence of reactionary cultural movements within races.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper I have sought to defend Sally Haslanger’s sociopolitical construction of race as argued in “Tracing the Sociopolitical Reality of Race,” a contribution to What is Race? Four Philosophical Views. I have argued against the many and varied objections of Chike Jeffers as published in “Jeffers’ Reply to Glasgow, Haslanger, and Spencer,” a contribution to the aforementioned volume. I have evaluated and compared Haslanger’s account using the metrics of explanatory power and conceptual clarity when applied to cultural diversity and outliers to cultural groups, individual agency, and the origin of race as a category that people are placed into. Finally, I have concluded that Sally Haslanger’s definition of race is sound as a functional and philosophical explanation of the term, standing up to the objections of Jeffers.
REFERENCES


